수시공시수준이 재무분석가수와 회사채평가등급에 미치는 영향 (Effects of Timely Disclosure Level on the Number of Financial Analysts and Bond Ratings)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국회계학회
· 수록지 정보 : 회계저널 / 24권 / 2호 / 1 ~ 36페이지
· 저자명 : 정명, 이상철

초록

본 연구에서는 수시공시를 수시자발공시와 수시강제공시로 구분하고, 수시자발공시수준을 수시자발공시건수 그리고 수시강제공시수준을 불성실공시법인지정여부로 측정한다. 또한 정보비대칭에 대한 대용치로 재무분석가수를 사용하고, 회사채평가등급을 타인자본비용의 대용치로 측정한다. 그런 다음 수시자발공시수준과 수시강제공시수준이 정보비대칭과 타인자본비용에 미치는 효과를 파악한다.
2002년부터 2012년까지 한국거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 비금융기업 가운데, 불성실공시법인으로 지정된 267개 기업-년 자료를 분석표본으로 선정하였다. 불성실공시법인지정 사유를 검토하여 대상정보를 성실하게 공시한 기업 중 같은 연도 및 산업에 속하며 자산규모 차이가 가장 작은 267개 기업-년 자료를 통제표본으로 선정하였다. 분석 및 통제표본을 합한 534개 기업-년 자료를 대상으로 분석을 실시하였으며, 주요 연구결과는 다음과 같다.
첫째, 불성실공시법인으로 지정된 기업일수록 재무분석가수가 적은 반면, 수시자발공시건수가 많을수록 재무분석가수가 많은 것으로 파악되었다. 둘째, 불성실공시법인으로 지정된 기업일수록 회사채평가등급이 낮은 반면, 수시자발공시건수가 많을수록 회사채평가등급이 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 수시공시수준이 높아지면 재무분석가수가 많아지고 회사채평가등급이 높아지는 것으로 나타나, 재무분석가수가 매개변수로서 역할을 수행하는 것으로 나타났다. 넷째, 재무분석가와 채권투자자는 수시강제공시수준보다 수시자발공시수준을 더 중요하게 고려하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 검증결과는 수시공시수준이 높아지면 정보비대칭이 감소되어 부채조달비용이 낮아질 것이라는 주장을 뒷받침한다.

영어초록

This paper examines the effects of timely disclosure level on information asymmetry and cost of debt capital. We conjecture that high level of timely disclosure decreases information asymmetry between managers and market participants, thereby reducing cost of debt capital.
Timely disclosure level is difficult to measure because it is not directly observable. First of all, we classify timely disclosure level into timely voluntary disclosure level and timely mandatory disclosure level. We define timely voluntary disclosure level as the number of timely voluntary disclosure and timely mandatory disclosure level as an indicator variable for unfaithful disclosure. In addition, because financial analysts have traditionally played vital roles as information intermediaries in the financial markets, we regard the number of financial analysts as a reflection of information asymmetry between managers and market participants. And then we measure cost of debt capital as a dependent variable by bond ratings which are assigned by Korea Investors Service (KIS), one of the Korean major bond-rating firms. KIS assigns bond ratings of Korean firms on a scale of twenty grades from AAA to D. Following Ahmed et al.(2002), we code these ratings such that AAA corresponds with 1 (the best rating) and D (the worst rating) with 20 to facilitate our empirical analyses. To investigate whether the timely disclosure level such as timely voluntary disclosure level and timely mandatory disclosure level decreases information asymmetry between managers and market participants, thereby cutting cost of debt capital, we set and estimate regression models.
We use 534 non-financing firm-year data concerning Korean listed companies for the period 2002-2012. Firms in the banking and finance industry were excluded from this study in order to enhance the comparability of the data, because the accounting principles and general attributes of financial firm data differ substantially from those of non-finance firm data. We selected 267 non-finance firms designated as unfaithful disclosure firms, matched with those not selected as unfaithful disclosure firms. The matching criteria used in this paper include year, industry and firm size.
Main findings of this study are as follows. First, while the indicator variable for unfaithful disclosure has a significantly negative influence on the number of financial analysts, the number of timely voluntary disclosure has a significant positive impact on the number of financial analysts. These results indicate that high level of timely disclosure decreases information asymmetry between managers and market participants, Second, whereas the dummy variable for unfaithful disclosure has a positive impact on cost of debt capital, the number of timely voluntary disclosure has a negative influence on cost of debt capital. These findings demonstrate that high level of timely disclosure reduces the cost of debt capital. Third, the number of financial analysts plays an important role in the association between timely disclosure level and cost of debt capital. These results show that high level of timely disclosure decreases cost of debt capital by reducing information asymmetry between managers and bond investors. Fourth, the effect of the number of timely voluntary disclosure on the number of financial analysts is greater than the effect of the unfaithful disclosure on that. In addition, the effect of the number of timely voluntary disclosure on cost of debt capital is greater than the effect of the unfaithful disclosure on that. These findings obviously certify that financial analysts and debt investors can consider timely voluntary disclosure more important than timely mandatory disclosure.
In sum, empirical findings of this study indicate that high level of timely disclosure decreases information asymmetry between managers and bond investors, thereby shortens cost of debt capital. Financial analysts and debt investors, moreover, can consider timely voluntary disclosure more important than timely mandatory disclosure.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, consistent with theories that demonstrate a role of information risk in asset pricing, we show that firms with low level of timely disclosure have higher costs of debt capital than do firms with high level. Second, empirical results of our paper also suggest several important implications for regulatory bodies on disclosure policy and regulation.

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