대형소매점의 단독 판매가 유통경로구조에 미치는 영향 (Effects of a Dominant Retailer’s Exclusive Dealing on Distribution Channel Structures)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국유통학회
· 수록지 정보 : 유통연구 / 20권 / 1호 / 61 ~ 91페이지
· 저자명 : 강영선

초록

본 연구는 제조업체 간 경쟁과 소매업체 간 경쟁을 고려한 두 가지 유통경로인 대칭적 포괄적 유통경로(symmetric full channel)와 비대칭적 혼합적 유통경로(asymmetric mixed channel)를 비교하였다. 대칭적 포괄적 유통경로에서는 두 제조업체가 두 소매업체에게 제품을 납품하고 비대칭적 혼합적 유통경로에서는 대형소매업체에 의한 단독판매 요구가 둘 중 하나의 제조업체에게 받아들여지고,소매업체 한 곳에서만 단독 판매하는 제품이 생기게 된다. 두 가지 다른 유통경로구조의 비교를 위하여 Trivedi(1998)의 연구에서 제시된 선형수요함수를 이용하여 제조업체 간, 그리고 소매업체 간의 경쟁을 포함한 모형을 분석하였다. 유통경로 상에 제조업체가 의사결정의 Stackelberg leader로서 도매가격을 먼저 정하는 경우와 소매업체가 의사결정의 Stackelberg leader로서 소매 마진을 먼저 정하는 경우를 비교하였다. 또한 두 소매업체 간의 한계소매비용이 동일한 경우와 대형소매업체가 한계소매비용에서 우위를 가지는 경우를 비교하였다. 분석결과, 제조업체가 Stackelberg leader인 경우와소매업체가 Stackelberg leader인 경우 그리고 두 소매업체 간 한계소매비용이 동일한 경우와 동일하지 않은 경우를 모두 포함하여 대칭적 포괄적 유통경로(symmetric full channel)가 내쉬 균형이 되었다.

영어초록

The purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of dominance of a retailer on channelmembers’ channel-structure selection. The issues of optimal channel selection have beenextensively explored. In a monopoly case, the vertical integration is optimal because thedecentralized channel has the double marginalization problem. In a duopoly case, a lot ofresearches examine the optimal channel selection under certain conditions (e.g., McGuire andStaelin 1983, Moorthy 1988, Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989, Trivedi 1998).
The dominant retailers often determine the success of the products and they are frequentlythe largest distributors for manufacturers (Luo, Kannan, and Ratchford 2007, Raju and Zhang2005). Thus, most manufacturers want the dominant retailers to carry their products in thestores, but the dominant retailers often have an ability to choose which products they sell intheir stores. The dominant retailers might ask one of the manufacturers to supply exclusivity tothem using their power in the market channel.
From the perspective of manufacturers, an exclusive dealing contract means when retailerscarry the brand of only one manufacturer. Several researches have been studied to understandwhy exclusive dealing occurs and the impact of exclusive dealing (Bernheim and Whinston1998, Besanko and Perry 1993, 1994). Bernheim and Whinston(1998) define the exclusiveretailer who contracts with only one manufacturer and the common retailer who contracts withmultiple manufacturers. They show that exclusion occurs only when it is efficient. The form ofrepresentation (exclusive or common) is chosen to maximize the joint surplus of themanufacturer and the retailer. They find that exclusive dealing may be adopted foranticompetitive reasons to enhance market power in noncoincident markets. Furthermore,exclusive dealing is arising when common representation involves externalities among the manufacturers that cause inefficiency in incentive contracting because manufacturers mightfree-ride with common representation. Besanko and Perry (1994) show that exclusive dealinggenerates higher profits for manufacturers and higher prices and higher transportation costs forconsumers. In addition, exclusive dealing may increase total surplus because it reduces thefixed costs of retailing. With exclusive dealing, the consumers need more cost to obtain whichbrand they prefer. They find that exclusive dealing enhances the degree to whichmanufacturers are differentiated by combining the brand differentiation with the retaildifferentiation. This results in higher wholesale prices and higher retail prices.
Prior literature considers exclusive dealing from the manufacturers’ perspective, in our paper,we define exclusive dealing from the perspective of retailer; the dominant retailer prohibits amanufacturer that supplies the exclusive product to other retailers. In this setting, retailers cancarry single or multiple products and compete with each other. Manufacturers also can supplyto two retailers or only dominant retailer when the dominant retailer asks the manufacturer toprovide the exclusivity. We analyze the impact of exclusive dealing from the perspective ofretailers using two channel structures: the symmetric full channel without exclusive dealingand the asymmetric mixed channel with exclusive dealing.
In this paper, we try to answer the following questions: (1) Should a retailer sell an exclusiveproduct which a manufacturer supplies to only that retailer, or should the retailer let themanufacturer also supply to the rival retailer and then two retailers compete each other? (2)When a retailer has advantage of marginal retailing cost compared to the rival retailer, shouldthe retailer seek this exclusive supply? (3) Does Stackelberg leadership play a role in thisdecision by the dominant retailer?We assume there are two manufacturers and two retailers in the market and define (i) thesymmetric full channel structure as one where two manufacturers sell their products to tworetailers; and (ii) the asymmetric mixed channel structure as one where one of twomanufacturers sells product through only one retailer and the other manufacturer sells productthrough two retailers. As a result, the retailer who carries both products can have the exclusivedealership of one of two products. Our paper will compare the symmetric full channelstructure without exclusive dealing to the asymmetric mixed channel structure with exclusivedealing. We examine the optimal distribution channel structure from the perspective of thedominant retailer, who has a marginal cost advantage over its competing retailer. Using a lineardemand function, we study two different channel structures and analytically derive closed formsolutions based on the concepts of “product substitutability” which is representing competitiveness at the manufacturer level and “store substitutability” which is representingcompetitiveness at the retailer level (Trivedi 1998).
We define a retailer as being dominant in the sense that it has advantage of the marginalretailing cost compared to his rival retailer. For example, Wal-Mart’s efficient operating systemand lower labor cost give it a cost advantage. Thus, we can assume that the dominant retailerhas lower marginal retailing cost per unit product and the weak retailer has higher marginalretailing cost per unit product. We also model two different power balance relationshipbetween the manufacturer and the retailer-the first in which the manufacturer plays aStackelberg leader and the second in which the retailer plays a Stackelberg leader.
We find that when two retailers have the same retailing cost, both retailers andmanufacturers prefer the symmetric full channel over all values of product substitutability andstore substitutability. In other words, the retailer may not have a profit incentive to request toget the exclusive supplying to prevent the rival store not carrying the same product. In theasymmetric mixed channel, the retailer carrying both products has the greater profits than therival retailer carrying only one product. Moreover, the manufacturer offering its product toboth retailers has the greater profits than the other manufacturer offering its product to onlyone retailer in the asymmetric mixed channel. The intuition is as follows. The asymmetricmixed channel, the retailer who is carrying only one product suffers from the doublemarginalization problem. The symmetric full channel allows the competitions at both productand retail levels, reducing the double marginalization problem and increases the total profits.
Therefore, both manufacturers and retailers are better off in the symmetric full channel. As thestore substitutability and product substitutability increase, there is more intense competition atretail and product levels, and hence the benefit of the symmetric full channel compared to theasymmetric mixed channel increases.
When we consider the cost advantage of the dominant retailer, the results are consistent withthe results above. Even though the dominant retailer’s advantage of marginal cost exists, boththe dominant retailer and the weak retailer prefer the symmetric full channel structure. Inaddition, both manufacturers have greater profits in the symmetric full channel than in theasymmetric mixed channel. Even though the dominant retailer becomes a monopolist ofexclusive products in the asymmetric mixed channel structure, manufacturers are still theStackelberg leader in the channel relationship and manufacturers know the retailers’ reactionfunctions. Manufacturers will set the higher wholesale price to take the retailer’s surplus whichthe retailer gets in the monopoly. When the retailer has the exclusivity in the asymmetricmixed channel, the dominant retailer’s net benefit may be lower than that of symmetric fullchannel.
When we assume that retailers are the Stackelberg leader and manufacturers are theStackelberg follower, the results are consistent with the results above. Even though retailershave the Stackelberg leadership in decision-making, both the dominant retailer and the weakretailer prefer the symmetric full channel structure.
This paper is the first step to investigate the effects of dominant retailer and exclusive dealingin the channel structure. Our future plan of the extended work is as follows. We can apply thebargaining formulations for the general case using the parameters representing the relativebargaining power of the retailers and manufacturers. The bargaining relationship will capturethe market power within the channel of competitive setting at the retail and product levels.
Moreover, it will capture bargaining asymmetry between dominant retailer and weak retailer.

참고자료

· 없음