최고경영자 교체에 영향을 미치는 요인분석:경영성과, 전문경영자, 대규모기업집단 (An Analysis of the Determinants of CEO Turnover:Firm Performance, Professional CEO, and Business Group)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 34권 / 1호 / 289 ~ 311페이지
· 저자명 : 신현한, 장진호

초록

본 연구는 1987년부터 2001년 사이에 증권거래소 및 코스닥에 상장·등록되어 있는 금융기업을 제외한 기업을 표본으로하여 경영성과가 최고경영자교체에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 최고경영자가 지배주주인 경우가 많으며, 대규모기업집단이 존재하는 우리나라 기업의 특성을 감안하여, 경영성과가 최고경영자교체에 미치는 영향이 전문경영자기업과 재벌소속기업에서 어떻게 다른지 분석하였다. 연구 결과, 소유경영자는 전문경영자와 비교하여 경영성과가 좋지 않은 경우에도 교체하기 어려움을 발견하였다. 그러나, 경영성과가 좋지 않은 최고경영자가 교체될 확률은 비재벌기업과 재벌소속 기업에서 유의적인 차이가 발견되지 않았다.

영어초록

Replacing poorly performing CEOs is one of the most important decisions that the board of directors and major shareholders can make, and this paper examines the determinants of CEO turnover, which includes firm performance, professional CEO and conglomerate. We use KISLINE, a database maintained by Korea Investors Service, Inc., to gather information on the top management team, in relation to the largest shareholder, ownership structure, and financial statements of firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange. Our sample is composed of companies listed in the Korea Stock Exchange between 1993 and 2002, excluding financial institutions.
Consistent with the previous findings for western firms, we also find using CEO turnover sample of Korean firms that poorly performing firm’s CEOs are more likely to be replaced.
We measure the performance with industry adjusted ROA, negative ROA dummy, and consecutive negative ROA dummy and we find that the results are qualitatively the same regardless of the definition of firm performance. The findings imply that the Korean firms also have a discipline to replace poorly performing CEOs.
Next we examine whether there is a relation between the CEO turnover and the CEO’s relation to the largest shareholder. The existing literature reports that the CEO turnover in relation to firm performance is less likely when the ownership of the CEO is high (McEachern 1975; Salancik and Pfeffer 1980; Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997). More specifically, Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) report that the CEO turnover is not sensitive to the firm performance when the insider ownership is high. It is because when insider ownership is high, the disciplinary effect of external capital markets on the monitoring of CEO performance is less. Consistent with the argument, Weston (1979) also reports that firms with insider ownership of 30% or more are never acquired.
We find that owner CEOs are less likely to be replaced than professional CEOs even though their firm performance is relatively poor. We define owner CEO as CEO identified as the largest shareholder, his/her son, daughter, cousin, uncle, etc.
Next we examine the effect of business group affiliation on the CEO turnover. A business group is an organizational form that is ubiquitous in most emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu 1997). In imperfect emerging markets, a business group is an efficient economic organization which minimizes transaction costs through internal markets. In a business environment where economic infrastructures, such as external markets, are underdeveloped, internal markets in business groups can substituteor complement imperfect external markets. By efficiently distributing scarce resources among affiliated firms within the same business group, and by decreasing transaction costs between suppliers and purchasers through vertical integration, diversified business groups can help their affiliated firms overcome market imperfection (Leff 1987 Chang and Choi 1998 Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991 Khanna and Palepu 2000).
In emerging markets, business groups play an intermediary role in the market for labor.
In many emerging markets, rigid labor laws make it difficult to hire and fire employees, hampering labor mobility, whereas a business group provides an internal labor market which facilitates labor mobility (Khanna and Palepu 2000). Labor resource allocation within a business group is performed by group headquarters. One of the primary roles of these staff members is the monitoring and evaluation of the performance of top executives of affiliated firms. The compensation and turnover decisions on every senior executive position in the Samsung group of affiliated firms are made by these staff members. Thus, group headquarters plays the role of the board of directors, monitoring and disciplining top management of group affiliated firms.
We find that the CEO turnover of business groupfirms is not more sensitive to firm performance than that of non-group firms, which is inconsistent with the argument that business group headquarter plays the role of board of directors.

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