원가행태의 하방경직성과 재량적 매출발생액 (Cost Stickiness and Discretionary Revenues)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국경영학회
· 수록지 정보 : 경영학연구 / 44권 / 4호 / 1183 ~ 1208페이지
· 저자명 : 정성환

초록

본 연구는 원가행태의 하방경직성과 재량적 매출발생액과의 상관관계를 살펴보았다. 원가행태는 하방경직적이라고 알려져있는데, 이는 경영자가 당기 매출이 감소한 시점에서 원가를 비례적으로 감소시키지 않고 운휴설비를 보유하게 될 때 나타난다. 이러한 경영자의 의사결정은 향후 매출추이에 대한 긍정적인 전망에 기인할 수도 있지만, 기업규모를 증가시켜자신이 누리는 사적효용의 크기를 증가시키려는 기회주의적 동기로부터 유발될 수도 있다. 본 연구는 대리인문제에 기반한 원가행태의 하방경직성에 주목하여 이러한 원가행태의 하방경직성이 재량적 매출발생액으로 이어지는지를 살펴보았다.
원가행태의 하방경직성이 사적효익 추구의 결과라면 이는 원가율 상승으로 이어질 것이고, 경영자는 이러한 비효율을 감추기 위해 재량적 매출발생액을 사용할 가능성이 높기 때문이다. 실증분석결과, 예상과 일치하게 전기 대비 당기 매출이감소하는 상황에서 대리인문제에 기반한 원가행태의 하방경직성이 증가할수록 원가율이 상승하고 재량적 매출발생액이 증가하는 것으로 나타났다.
본 연구의 실증분석결과는 대리인문제에 기반한 원가행태의 하방경직성이 경영자의 이익조정성향에 미치는 영향을 분석함으로써 재무정보를 이용하는 시장참여자들에게 많은 시사점을 제공한다.

영어초록

Prior studies find that costs rise more with increases in activity volume than they fall with decreases and label this asymmetric cost behavior as sticky cost(Anderson et al. 2003). Many factors influence the extent of cost stickiness: current sales change; prior period resource levels; expected future sales; agency and behavioral factors. This study focuses on part of cost stickiness that is attributable to agency problems and investigates the association between this type of cost stickiness and managerial opportunism.
To the extent that cost stickiness arises directly from optimal managerial behavior with adjustment costs rather than from managers’ deliberate resource commitment decisions in the presence of adjustment costs, costs to sales ratios likely increase. In turn, managers may attempt to conceal the inefficiency by managing earnings through discretionary revenues. Relying on this intuition, this study hypothesizes that cost stickiness results in discretionary revenues.
Specifically, based on Chen et al.’s(2012) evidence that cost stickiness of firms where free cash flow is high, the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors is low, or the number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding is driven by the agency problem, this study investigates whether cost stickiness of these firms leads to discretionary revenue.
Consistent with the hypothesis, this study finds that cost stickiness driven by the agency problem is positively associated with discretionary revenue. This association is observed only in the subsample where current sales level before increasing sales through discretionary revenue is lower than prior sales level, suggesting that a decrease in demand encourages the managerial opportunism. In addition, the evidence shows that cost stickiness driven by the agency problem is positively associated with costs to sales ratios. This supports the interpretation that the mechanism underlying the association between the cost stickiness and discretionary revenues is the inefficiency associated with resource commitment decisions.
This study advances the literature on the effects of cost stickiness. There is much evidence on the causes of cost stickiness(e.g., Anderson et al. 2003; Kama and Weiss 2013; Banker and Byzalov 2013). However, the understanding is far from complete regarding how cost stickiness affects the information environment. The findings of this study suggest that cost stickiness negatively affects the information environment. When costs behave asymmetrically, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons of time-series and cross-sectional cost information, and as a result investors may not discern whether costs are properly reported. In addition, more importantly, the evidence of this study shows that cost stickiness driven by the agency problem leads to managerial opportunistic incentives to inflate sales.

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