기업지배구조와 주주부의 배분에 관한 연구 (Corporate Governance and the Distribution of Shareholder Wealth)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국증권학회
· 수록지 정보 : Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies / 34권 / 4호 / 149 ~ 188페이지
· 저자명 : 박광우, 박래수, 황이석

초록

본 연구는 기업지배구조와 주주부의 관계를 분석하였다. 이를 위해 본 연구에서는 한국 기업지배구조개선지원센터의 평가를 받는 국내상장기업을 대상으로 먼저 기업의 지배구조와 배당정책이 해당기업의 가치에 미치는 영향을 분석한 후, 기업지배구조와 여타 기업특성들이 어떻게 주주부를 배분하는 결정요인으로 작용하는가를 살펴보았다.
실증분석결과, 국내 상장기업들은 기업지배구조가 건전하고 배당수익률이 높을수록 기업가치가 높게 평가되며, 기업지배구조가 좋은 기업일수록 평균적으로 높은 배당수익률을 보이고 있음을 발견하였다. 이는 비록 국내자본시장에서는 법적여건의 미비로 투자자보호가 여의치 않지만, 개별기업의 차원에서는 주주보호를 위한 장치가 잘 갖추어지고 지배구조가 좋을수록 주주들에게 나누어주는 경제적 혜택이 크고, 이로 인해 자본시장에서 투자자들로부터 해당기업의 가치가 높게 평가받는 것으로 보인다.
또한 기업지배구조가 배당수익률에 미치는 긍정적 효과가 성장기회가 많은 기업일수록, 그리고 대리인문제가 적은 기업일수록 크다는 것도 확인하였다. 이는 기업지배구조가 건전한 기업들은 성장(혹은 투자)기회가 많고 대리인문제가 적을수록 높은 배당수익률을 통해 자신의 가치를 시장에게 전달하여 향후 투자재원의 저렴한 조달을 모색하는 것으로 보인다. 그러나 지배구조가 좋더라도 성장기회가 적은 기업이라면 굳이 많은 배당을 지급할 유인이 적은 것으로 해석된다. 이는 기존의 잉여현금가설의 예측과 일치하는 결과로서, 기업지배구조가 나쁜 기업에서 대리인문제가 심각할 경우 배당지급을 많이 함으로써 관련대리인비용을 줄일 수 있지만, 지배구조가 좋은 기업이라면 굳이 비싼 배당지급을 통하지 않더라도 대리인비용을 줄일 수 있음을 시사한다.
따라서 이러한 분석결과는 Bhojraj and Sengupta(2003)와 더불어, 기업지배구조가 좋은 기업들이 왜 시장에서 긍정적으로 평가되는 지에 대한 또 하나의 논거를 제시한다.

영어초록

In this paper, we examine one important over-looked area in finance: the relationship between corporate governance and wealth redistribution to shareholders. We find that firms with sound governance practices are associated with both high firm value and high dividend payments using a set of unique, comprehensive survey data on corporate governance practices of firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange. This positive effect of good corporate governance on payout policies is further accentuated with firms having greater investment opportunities and low agency costs. This suggests that firms practicing good corporate governance are willing to send out positive signals to the market by paying out higher dividends when they face a great investment opportunities with low agency costs, so that they can achieve the goal of low cost borrowing in the long run.
The importance of corporate governance reform in enhancing firm value has been stressed by policy makers and academicians around the world in recent years. The majority of the existing studies however have primarily focused on the determinants of corporate governance practices and the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. For example, Black(2001), Klapper and Love(2003), and Durnev and Kim(2005) use governance indexes obtained from survey data and find the positive relationship between corporate governance and firm value. However, the corporate governance scoring survey results reflected in theses studies are generally from for-profit organizations such as Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia(CLSA) Score or S&P's Corporate Governance Score. The problem with using these data is that they can be potentially biased because the survey results are likely to reflect the business interests between the rating institutions and their client firms. On the other hand, the Korea Corporate Governance Service(KCGS), a not-for-profit institution affiliated with the Korea Stock Exchange, surveys listed firms annually to observe the progress in their corporate governance reforms.
In the existing literature, only a few studies explore the economic consequences of firms practicing good corporate governance. Among the few studies on this issue, Bhojraj and Sengupta(2003) find that firms with greater institutional ownership and stronger outside board control enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new bond issues. This suggests that governance mechanisms reduce the cost of debt capital by mitigating agency costs and by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and the lenders. This study extends this line of inquiry by examining the cross-sectional relation between the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and dividend payout policies. We focus our attention on firms' dividend payments instead of share repurchases, since dividends are currently the dominant means of redistributing corporate wealth to shareholders in Korea. Furthermore, stock repurchases are largely used as an instrument against aggressive takeover attempts by controlling shareholders in Korea.
This study contributes to the corporate finance literature on the economic consequences of sound corporate governance by examining the relationship between governance rankings and the firms' payout policies. Our findings are consistent with the view by La Porta et al.(2000) that insiders at listed Korean firms with poor protection of minority shareholder rights are likely to suffer a lack of incentives to return corporate earnings to shareholders. An enhanced understanding of the role of governance practices in determining dividend policies provides us with better insights into the systems that can minimize insiders' expropriation of minority shareholders.

참고자료

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