P2P 대출과 공급망 금융 (Peer-to-peer Lending and Supply Chain Finance)

서지정보

· 발행기관 : 한국재무학회
· 수록지 정보 : 재무연구 / 33권 / 3호 / 439 ~ 463페이지
· 저자명 : 류두진, 박대현

초록

본 논문은 전자상거래에서의 선정산 서비스를 자금공급자에 따라 P2P 대출중개 플랫폼의선정산 서비스와 은행의 선정산 서비스로 구분하고, 대안금융의 측면에서 비교한다. 이를위해 뉴스벤더 모형을 바탕으로 수요함수를 구성하고, P2P 대출이 갖는 역경매의 특성을바탕으로 공급함수를 구성하여 새로운 모형을 제시한다. 본 논문의 모형을 통해, 자금공급자별로 선정산 서비스의 균형할인율을 도출하고, 균형할인율의 결정요인에 따라은행과 P2P 플랫폼의 할인율을 비교한다. 분석결과, 소매업자에게 더 낮은 할인율의선정산 서비스를 제공할 수 있는 주체는 시장의 상황에 따라 다르게 나타난다. 즉, 판매시장의 상황이 소매업자에게 불리할수록, 유동성에 대한 선호가 작을수록, P2P 투자자의위험회피성향이 작을수록, P2P 투자자가 전자상거래 플랫폼의 신용위험을 정확하게추정할수록, P2P 플랫폼이 제시하는 할인율이 은행의 할인율보다 작게 된다. 은행의할인율이 경직적이면 소상공인의 부담을 줄이기 위해서 P2P 플랫폼의 할인율을 낮출필요가 있으며, 이를 위해 P2P 대출 활성화를 위한 논의가 필요하다는 정책적 함의를제시한다.

영어초록

This paper analyzes reverse factoring in e-commerce, which is currently receiving increasing attention. As Internet technology advances during the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the e-commerce market is also growing. However, e-commerce retailers cannot keep up with the growth of the market, due to capital constraints.
Supply chain finance can offer a solution to the capital constraints of e-commerce retailers. In particular, reverse factoring, a kind of supply chain finance, is a service that exchanges accounts receivable for discounted cash. It can ease the capital constraints of e-commerce retailers. Recently, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have begun to offer reverse factoring services to fill gaps in the provision of traditional financial institutions, such as banks. Supplying these reverse factoring services at a relatively low discount rate is conducive to the growth of e-commerce retailers.
Therefore, we compare the discount rate of reverse factoring services according to whether the bank or the P2P platform provides the service. The existing literature on supply chain finance focuses on exploring whether retailers use supply chain finance. However, this paper compares the types of service provider used. Therefore, the models used in previous discussions are not directly applicable to the analysis in this paper. We extend the newsvendor model by reflecting the characteristics of P2P lending in our supply chain financial service analysis. We construct a demand function for retailers utilizing the newsvendor model. We also construct a supply function for each financer. We focus on the reverse auction system to explain the characteristics of P2P lending. A reverse auction is the opposite of a general auction.
In the former, which many sellers compete in offering a price to a single consumer buying a product. In P2P lending, the P2P platform presents the target amount and rate of return for each loan. In this process, the platform sets the rate of return to the level at which the target amount can be raised, considering the competition among the investors. Therefore, P2P lending takes the form of a reverse auction.
We consider the reverse auction form when constructing the supply of the P2P platform. This paper diverges from previous research in analyzing the demand for and supply of reverse factoring to calculate an equilibrium. The analysis reveals that the financer that can provide retailers with a low discount rate depends on market conditions: the situation in the sales market, the retailer’s preference for liquidity, and the retailer’s estimation of the credit risk of the e-commerce platform. The reverse factoring supply is divided into supply by the bank and supply by the P2P platform. Factors affecting the supply by the bank are the rate of return that the bank can obtain from an alternative investment option and the estimated credit risk of the e-commerce platform. Lastly, the risk aversion of P2P investors and the estimated credit risk of the e-commerce platform affect the supply by the P2P platform. We present policy implications based on these analyses. Given that P2P financing is a type of alternative financing, it is expected to offer a reverse factoring service to e-commerce retailers at a low discount rate. However, contrary to expectations, banks are currently offering services at a lower discount rate than P2P platforms are.
This seems to be due to the inherent information asymmetry in the P2P lending market, which leads P2P investors to overestimate the credit risk of e-commerce platforms. This plays a key role in reducing the supply of reverse factoring through P2P platforms. If the bank’s discount rate is rigid, the discount rate of the P2P platform must be reduced to reduce the burden on small e-commerce retailers. Therefore, policy discussions on ways of boosting P2P lending should be carried out. It is also essential to mitigate information asymmetry in the P2P lending market.

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